有哪位高手能帮忙把下面这段论文摘要翻译成英文,比较紧急!谢绝利用网络在线翻译工具!

从中国的实际情况来看,关于中央银行独立性问题,早在20世纪80年代中期中国人民银行就开始正式行使中央银行职能。20世纪90年代前半期,在《中国人民银行法》起草、审议过程中,中国学术界曾有过两次大的讨论。在总结历次高通货膨胀经验教训的基础上,经过20世纪80年代中期和90年代中期的两次改革,目前中国人民银行在独立执行货币政策方面较之计划经济时期有了较大进步,也取得了明显效果,这突出地表现在90年代中期以后对通货膨胀的有效治理上。
与此同时,我们也应当看到,由于种种原因,目前中国的中央银行在独立执行货币政策方面,尽管地方政府的直接干预已被基本杜绝,但是间接干预依然存在(如通过拯救濒临破产的地方性金融机构从人民银行争取再贷款);并且,中央政府部门对于中央银行的变相干预也依然存在(如有关部门在处理银行不良资产和债转股过程中的各种干预都将最终导致中央银行再贷款的增加)。而在货币政策决策方面,中央银行(确切地讲应当是中央银行的货币政策委员会)不仅缺乏应有的独立性,在操作上也缺乏规范和透明。只要中央银行缺乏足够的独立性,只要各级政府各种形式的干预依然存在,追求货币币值稳定和宏观经济环境稳定的目标就难以达到,其结果必然要么是承受高通货膨胀的压力,要么则面临通货紧缩的威胁。尤其是随着中国加入WTO和国民经济的快速发展,外国政府迟早将会向中国政府施加各种压力,要求人民币人为升值,而应对的有效办法之一就是加强中央银行的独立性和货币政策决策的科学性与规范化。
20世纪80年代中期,由于日本经济的快速发展,发达国家通过“广场协议”联手向日本施压,胁迫日本政府人为推动日元升值。由于当时日本银行缺乏应有的独立性,日本政府没有任何回旋余地。因此,处于日本政府(大藏省)直接控制之下的日本银行实行了日元升值政策。在日元大幅度升值以后,日本银行又不得不采取放松银根等措施以应对“元高不景气”(因日元升值而导致出口受阻引发的经济萧条),最终酿成“泡沫经济”的恶果,遗害至今。这恐怕也正是日本近年来积极推进中央银行改革、加强其独立性的一个潜在原因。
有鉴于此,当务之急应进一步加强中央银行的独立性。一方面,改变中央银行行长的任免程序,将目前中央银行对国务院负责的隶属关系改变为对全国人大或人大财经委员会负责;另一方面,应将货币政策委员会从目前的“咨询议事机构”提升为“决策机构”,将货币政策的决策程序规范化、科学化,并适当增强其透明度。
为在这一转变过程中能够保持中国货币政策及金融市场的稳定,可以采用渐进方式加以推进,即逐步调整货币政策委员会的成员构成比例,初期以政府代表为主,待条件成熟以后再逐渐减少政府方面的代表比例,相应增加市场方面的代表比例。这样做,不仅有利于实现币值稳定的货币政策目标,为经济发展创造良好的宏观经济环境,而且可以为中国政府抵御外部压力创造更大的回旋空间。■

Looked from China's actual situation that, about the Central Bank independent question, as early as starts in 1980s intermediate stage People's Bank of China to exercise the Central Bank function officially.1990s first half issue, drafts, in the consideration process in "Chinese people Banking law", the Chinese academic circles once has had two big discussions.In the summary all previous high inflation experience lesson foundation, passes through 1980s intermediate stages and the 90's intermediate stage two reforms, at present People's Bank of China had in the independent execution monetary policy aspect compared with the planned economy time progressed greatly, also has obtained the tangible effect, this will display prominently in the 90's intermediate stages later to the inflation effective government in. At the same time, we also must see, as a result of all sorts of reasons, at present China's Central Bank in independent execution monetary policy aspect, although local authority's direct intervention was ceased basically, but intervenes indirectly still exists (for example through saves borders on bankrupt local financial organ to strive for from People's Bank loans again); And, the central authorities department still will also have (for example the department concerned regarding Central Bank's in disguised form intervention in to process bank not good property and debt transfers shares of stock in process each kind of intervention all finally to cause increase which the Central Bank will again loan).Not only but in the monetary policy decision-making aspect, the Central Bank (says accurately must be Central Bank's monetary policy committee) the independence which lacks should have, also lacks in the operation is standard and is transparent.So long as the Central Bank lacks the enough independence, so long as all levels of government each form intervention still exists, the pursue currency currency value stable and the macroscopic economic environment stable goal with difficulty achieved, its result inevitably either is withstands the high inflation the pressure, either faces the deflation the threat.Will in particular join WTO and the national economy fast development along with China, the foreign government sooner or later can exert each pressure to the Chinese government, the request Renminbi artificial revaluation, but will be supposed to one of effective means will be the enhancement Central Bank's independence and the monetary policy decision-making scientific nature and the standardization.
1980s intermediate stages, as a result of the Japanese economy fast development, the developed country pass “the square agreement” the collaboration to exert pressure to Japan, force a Japanese Government artificial impetus Japanese Yen revaluation.Because at that time Bank of Japan lacked the independence which should have, Japanese Government not any maneuver leeway.Therefore, was in Japanese Government (Okura Sho) under positive governing Bank of Japan to implement the Japanese Yen revaluation policy.After Japanese Yen large scale revaluation, Bank of Japan can not but adopt measures and so on relaxation money market to meet to “Yuan Gao is not booming” (causes export because of a Japanese Yen revaluation to be blocked initiation economic depression), finally breeds “the bubble economy” the evil consequence, leaves a legacy of evil until now.Perhaps this also was precisely Japan positively advances the Central Bank to reform, to strengthen an its independent in recent years latent reason.
The taking this into consideration, the urgent matter should further strengthen the Central Bank the independence.At the same time, change Central Bank president appoints and dismisses the procedure, at present the Central Bank for is responsible for the State Council responsible subordination relations change for National People's Congress or National People's Congress Finance and economics Committee; On the other hand, should “the consultation discuss official business the organization” the monetary policy committee from at present the promotion is “the policy-making organ”, the monetary policy decision-making procedure standardization, the scientific style, and strengthens suitably its transparency. For can maintain the China monetary policy and the money market stability in this transformation, may select the evolution method to advance, namely adjusts the monetary policy committee gradually the member constitutes the proportion, the initial period represents by the government primarily, treats representative who conditions are ripe later gradually will reduce the government aspect again proportion, will increase the market aspect correspondingly representative proportion.Does this, not only is advantageous to the realization currency value stable monetary policy goal, for economical development creation good macroscopic economic environment, moreover may resist the external pressure for the Chinese government to create the bigger maneuver space.■
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第1个回答  2008-08-15
Looked from China's actual situation that, about the Central Bank independent question, as early as starts in 1980s intermediate stage People's Bank of China to exercise the Central Bank function officially.1990s first half issue, drafts, in the consideration process in "Chinese people Banking law", the Chinese academic circles once has had two big discussions.In the summary all previous high inflation experience lesson foundation, passes through 1980s intermediate stages and the 90's intermediate stage two reforms, at present People's Bank of China had in the independent execution monetary policy aspect compared with the planned economy time progressed greatly, also has obtained the tangible effect, this will display prominently in the 90's intermediate stages later to the inflation effective government in. At the same time, we also must see, as a result of all sorts of reasons, at present China's Central Bank in independent execution monetary policy aspect, although local authority's direct intervention was ceased basically, but intervenes indirectly still exists (for example through saves borders on bankrupt local financial organ to strive for from People's Bank loans again); And, the central authorities department still will also have (for example the department concerned regarding Central Bank's in disguised form intervention in to process bank not good property and debt transfers shares of stock in process each kind of intervention all finally to cause increase which the Central Bank will again loan).Not only but in the monetary policy decision-making aspect, the Central Bank (says accurately must be Central Bank's monetary policy committee) the independence which lacks should have, also lacks in the operation is standard and is transparent.So long as the Central Bank lacks the enough independence, so long as all levels of government each form intervention still exists, the pursue currency currency value stable and the macroscopic economic environment stable goal with difficulty achieved, its result inevitably either is withstands the high inflation the pressure, either faces the deflation the threat.Will in particular join WTO and the national economy fast development along with China, the foreign government sooner or later can exert each pressure to the Chinese government, the request Renminbi artificial revaluation, but will be supposed to one of effective means will be the enhancement Central Bank's independence and the monetary policy decision-making scientific nature and the standardization.
1980s intermediate stages, as a result of the Japanese economy fast development, the developed country pass “the square agreement” the collaboration to exert pressure to Japan, force a Japanese Government artificial impetus Japanese Yen revaluation.Because at that time Bank of Japan lacked the independence which should have, Japanese Government not any maneuver leeway.Therefore, was in Japanese Government (Okura Sho) under positive governing Bank of Japan to implement the Japanese Yen revaluation policy.After Japanese Yen large scale revaluation, Bank of Japan can not but adopt measures and so on relaxation money market to meet to “Yuan Gao is not booming” (causes export because of a Japanese Yen revaluation to be blocked initiation economic depression), finally breeds “the bubble economy” the evil consequence, leaves a legacy of evil until now.Perhaps this also was precisely Japan positively advances the Central Bank to reform, to strengthen an its independent in recent years latent reason.
The taking this into consideration, the urgent matter should further strengthen the Central Bank the independence.At the same time, change Central Bank president appoints and dismisses the procedure, at present the Central Bank for is responsible for the State Council responsible subordination relations change for National People's Congress or National People's Congress Finance and economics Committee; On the other hand, should “the consultation discuss official business the organization” the monetary policy committee from at present the promotion is “the policy-making organ”, the monetary policy decision-making procedure standardization, the scientific style, and strengthens suitably its transparency. For can maintain the China monetary policy and the money market stability in this transformation, may select the evolution method to advance, namely adjusts the monetary policy committee gradually the member constitutes the proportion, the initial period represents by the government primarily, treats representative who conditions are ripe later gradually will reduce the government aspect again proportion, will increase the market aspect correspondingly representative proportion.Does this, not only is advantageous to the realization currency value stable monetary policy goal, for economical development creation good macroscopic economic environment, moreover may resist the external pressure for the Chinese government to create the bigger maneuver space.

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