第1个回答 2008-05-24
Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information, where the creditor cannot credibly commit to liquidate the firm if the default occurs. In our setting we consider a bankruptcy law to be a one-dimensional variable that influences creditor's expectation value of collateral. We find that there is an interval of the bankruptcy law, where the number of liquidations decreases in the toughness of the bankruptcy law. We also find that if the liquidation costs are high, softer bankruptcy law is preferred.
Keywords: Bankruptcy law ; Debt renegotiation; Soft budget constraint
1. Introduction
Bankruptcy laws are recognized as fundamental institutions necessary for growth of credit markets and entrepreneurship. They define the rules and procedures under which a creditor can take possession of entrepreneur's assets and hence directly influence the creditor's incentives to liquidate an insolvent company. Ideally, a bankruptcy law should protect creditors, impose financial discipline on managers, induce restructuring, and free assets from inefficient use. However, there is no clear agreement on the optimal bankruptcy law design. Moreover, bankruptcy laws differ across countries substantially along many dimensions such as allocation of control rights, priority rules or the role of judges and courts. Not surprisingly, it is unlikely that a single design of these bankruptcy laws fits all possible situations1 and different bankruptcy law designs have different effects on the number of liquidations in the country. observe different effects of the bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations with respect to different quality of law enforcement.
第2个回答 2008-05-27
A further concern with implementing our procedure in the current environment of Eastern Europe is that it would burden state banks (which are the main creditors of most large enterprises in the East) with responsibilities in the reorganized companies, which they could hardly assume given their bureaucratic management structures and methods. (State banks are often unable to perform such operations as taking deposits, giving account balances, transfer-ring money, etc., let alone evaluating projects and monitoring enterprises' managers.)We have little to say on this score. The commercialization and/or privatization of state banks would, of course, help-as would the setting up of adequate supervising institutions, such as banking commissions. (These changes are urgently required as part of the transition reform package any-way.) In addition, state banks could be obliged to sell the bulk of their equity to the private sector within a limited time period-say, five years-in order to avoid the possibility that the implementation of our procedure in the case of newly privatized firms with large state-bank creditors would merely lead to renationalization.
o(∩_∩)o...我有点不好意思......本回答被提问者采纳